Abstract：This paper introduces the traditional social-welfare game model into the BA scale-free network to find out the relationship between the model and the evolutionary process of the public opinion. Taking into account of the study and imitative behaviors to the other gamers in the information structure, it carries on the simulation experiment, and gets the conclusion that small-world effects have positive impact on the information communication and gambling result, so it is a useful tool for government, while propagation speed and the opportunity when the government should control the public opinion are cooperated to influence the information dissemination. In a word, it is not that the earlier the government steps in, the better result we can see.
谌楠, 王恒山. 网络舆情政府干预最佳点选择的研究[J]. 现代图书情报技术, 2012, 28(3): 53-58.
Chen Nan, Wang Hengshan. A Research About the Best Time Points for the Government to Intervene Network Public Opinion. New Technology of Library and Information Service, 2012, 28(3): 53-58.
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